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CASE COMMENTS
curtailing growth, especially among small communities on the fringe
of urban sprawl, and for the development of comprehensive land use
planning to protect the environment. This interest suggests that the
courts will be called upon more frequently to consider the constitu-
tional questions raised by local ordinances designed to meet these
ends. Thus, while Belle Terre gives a green light to increased govern-
mental control of land use, it also extends the constitutionally ac-
ceptable boundary of zoning regulation. But the decision does not
delineate this boundary; that will have to await another case.
Federal Jurisdiction-WATER POLLUTION CONTROL-FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 REACH POLLUTING
ACTIVITIES OCCURRING ABOVE MEAN HIGH-WATER LINE.-United States
v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
Without a federal permit Langston Holland and his associates
were filling mangrove wetlands and man-made canals in preparation
for future development of a 281 acre tract known as Harbor Isle, ad-
joining Papy's Bayou on Tampa Bay.' The United States, through the
Environmental Protection Agency, alleged that this operation violated
both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19722
and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,3 and sought an order pro-
1. The Court detailed the inter-tidal nature of the area:
2. For the purposes of the preliminary injunction hearing the Court accepted
defendants' determination that the mean high water line is one foot above sea level.
3. Tide data, visual observation and classification of vegetation established that
a substantial number of tides exceed two feet above sea level.
(a) The United States Geological Survey tide gauge data indicated that 50-100
tides exceed two feet in the subject water each year.
4. The parties stipulated to the accuracy of a land survey introduced by de-
fendants....
(a) Most of the property is interlaced with artificial mosquito canals containing
water.
(b) The water in the mosquito canals is connected to Papy's Bayou.
(c) The elevation of much of the property is less than two feet.
6. Defendants would continue to discharge sand, dirt, dredged spoil and biological
materials until the fill created has effectively displaced tidal waters, thereby
eliminating the normal ebb and flow of tides over the subject property.
United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 667 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
2. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (Supp. 1974).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1970).
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hibiting further filling and requiring restoration of mangrove wet-
lands.4 The defendants argued that the 1972 Amendments, like the
Rivers and Harbors Act,5 apply only to "navigable waters," and con-
tended that no federal permit was required since their land fill did not
directly affect such waters. The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida dismissed defendant's reading of the 1972
Amendments and held that the Amendments prohibit filling activities
without a permit even on land only "periodically inundated by tidal
waters.'' In reaching its decision the court rejected the mean high-
tide line as a limit on federal jurisdiction under the Water Pollution
Control Act; the court reasoned that the line "has no rational connec-
tion to the aquatic ecosystems which the FWPCA is intended to pro-
tect."
Even today the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA) remains
an important federal law for combating water pollution. 8 Federal
jurisdiction under the RHA, however, is limited to those cases in
which the water body involved is "navigable."9 The generally accepted
test holds that "a waterway is navigable and subject to federal regu-
lation if (1) it is presently being used or is suitable for use, or (2) it
has been used or was suitable for use in the past, or (3) it could be
made suitable for use in the future by reasonable improvements for
transportation and commerce." 10 It seems difficult to imagine a water
body of any significant size that would not satisfy one of these criteria;
but marshes, wetlands and smaller feeder streams often have been
4. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 667 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1970). The term "navigable waters" is discussed at notes
8-11 and accompanying text infra.
6. 373 F. Supp. at 676.
7. Id.
8. The Supreme Court has observed that one-third of all oil pollution prosecutions
are brought pursuant to the RHA. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224,
226 (1966). Although there was considerable confusion as to whether pollution suits
should be instituted under the RHA or under the predecessor of the Water Pollution
Control Act, 74 suits for injunctive relief were filed pursuant to the RHA between
March 1970 and January 1972. Druley, The Refuse Act of 1899, ENv. REP.-MONOGRAPHs,
Monograph No. 11, at 6-10 & n.123 (1972).
9. See 373 F. Supp. at 670. As one observer aptly noted, " 'navigability' is now no
more than a base that federal courts feel obligated to touch when clearing the path
for the progress of federal policies or programs." Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge
and Fill Jurisdiction: Buttressing a Citadel Under Seige, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 19, 23
(1973) (footnotes omitted).
10. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 344 F.2d 594, 596
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 832 (1965); accord, United States v. Pot-Nets, Inc., 363
F. Supp. 812, 815 (D. Del. 1973) (footnotes omitted), citing United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
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denied federal protection because the determination of navigability
is a question of fact in each instance."'
Once a body of water is deemed navigable under the RHA it still
must be determined how far the boundaries of that body extend.
Federal jurisdiction is coextensive with those boundaries. Therefore,
the regulations of the Army Corps of Engineers, which specify the
boundaries of navigable water bodies, also establish the limits of RHA
jurisdiction.1 2 In coastal areas this jurisdiction "extends to the line on
the shore reached by the plane of the mean (average) high water." 1
Jurisdiction over bays and estuaries is further delineated:
Regulatory jurisdiction extends to the entire surface and bed of all
water bodies subject to tidal action. Jurisdiction thus extends to
the edge . . . of all such water bodies even though portions of the
water body may be extremely shallow, or obstructed by shoals, vege-
tation, or other barriers. Marshlands and similar areas are thus
considered "navigable in law," but only so far as the area is subject
to inundation by the mean high waters. The relevant test is there-
fore the presence of the mean high tidal waters . . .4
By interpreting the 1972 Amendments to extend federal authority
over water pollution beyond the mean high-tide line, the Holland
court departed significantly from the traditional constraints of the
"navigable waters" test for federal jurisdiction. Although the prohibi-
tory provisions of the 1972 Amendments do include the phrase "navi-
gable water,"15 the court found that Congress had intended to remove
the navigability requirement from the definition of that phrase.' 6 The
11. The court in United States v. Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Corp., 353 F. Supp. 451,
455 (E.D. Ky. 1973), found that "[s]ince the decision made in The Daniel Ball ....
the question [of navigability] has been one of fact." See United States v. Cannon, 363 F.
Supp. 1045 (D. Del. 1973); United States v. Pot-Nets, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 812, 816-17 (D.
Del. 1973).
12. Under the RHA the enforcement of the Act and the processing of permits
was delegated to the Secretary of the Army and to the Chief of Engineers. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401-07 (1970).
13. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(k)(1)(ii) (1973).
14. Id. § 209.260(k)(2) (emphasis added).
15. For example, after declaring unlawful "the discharge of any pollutant by any
person .... " 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (Supp. 1974), the Amendments proceed to define
"discharge" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(12) (Supp. 1974).
16. 373 F. Supp. at 671. Legislative history supports the court's finding that Congress
did not intend to limit the protective scope of the 1972 Amendments to those waters
traditionally defined as "navigable." See note 21 infra. Accord, United States v. Ashland
Oil & Transp. Co., No. 73-2161 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 1974). But cf. Save America's Vital En-
vironment, Inc. v. Butz, 347 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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Amendments, without qualification, define "navigable waters" as
"waters of the United States including the territorial seas." 17 Invoking
this broad definition, the Holland court had no difficulty in determin-
ing that the Amendments should reach discharges into mangrove wet-
lands and man-made mosquito canals.' Under the navigability criteria
of the RHA this conclusion would have been debatable, even though
the canals were permanent bodies of water and would conduct pollu-
tants into navigable waters. Thus, the court's interpretation of the
1972 Amendments enables the government to prevent the entry of
pollutants into navigable waters by recognizing federal authority to
act when offensive matter is discharged from any "point source."' 9
Officials no longer will be required to wait until a navigable body of
water actually is being polluted before seeking civil or criminal sanc-
tions. 2
0
In support of its determination that the protective scope of the
1972 Amendments reaches wetlands above the mean high-tide line, the
court looked to the history of the new legislation,2' as well as its stated
17. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7) (Supp. 1974).
18. See 373 F. Supp. at 673-74.
19. "Point source" is defined as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14)
(Supp. 1974).
20. Heretofore the government has been required to wait until a navigable water
body actually was being polluted before instituting legal action. See Druley, The Refuse
Act of 1899, ENv. REP.-MONOGRAPHS, Monograph No. 11 (1972); Barry, The Evolution
of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of
the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MicH. L. REv. 1103, 1116, 1121-22
(1970).
21. See 373 F. Supp. at 671-72. The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments
clearly seems to support the Holland court's expansion of the traditional "navigability"
concept. The Committee of Conference explained its deletion of the word "navigable"
fr6m the statutory definition, see note 17 and accompanying text supra, of the phrase
"navigable waters": "The conferees fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be
given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency deter-
minations which have been made or may be made for administrative purposes." 373
F. Supp. at 672, quoting from COMM. OF CONFERENCE, JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, S.
REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Elaborating further on the Committee's
intention, Representative Dingell explained:
"The Conference bill defined the term 'navigable waters' broadly for water quality
purposes .... It means 'all waters of the United States' in a geographic sense. It
does not mean 'navigable waters of the United States' in the technical sense as we
sometimes see in some laws." . . .
"Thus, this new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, including
main streams and their tributaries, for water quality purposes. No longer are the
old, narrow definitions of navigability, as determined by the Corps of Engineers,
going to govern matters covered by this bill."
[Vol. 2
1974] CASE COMMENTS
purpose.22 The court did not accept this purpose as conclusive proof
of congressional intent to extend federal jurisdiction beyond its tra-
ditional limits; nonetheless, the court noted that "these sections do
reveal ... a sensitivity to the value of a coastal breeding ground." 23 In
order to combat threats to this coastal environment, the court ob-
served, Congress had "broadened its jurisdiction to encompass 'all
waters of the United States.' "24
In condoning this broad exercise of federal jurisdiction under the
1972 Amendments, the Holland court relied on the power of Congress
to control polluting activities that affect interstate commerce.2 5 The
commerce clause, of course, now reaches any activity that has even a
remote impact on interstate commerce.26 Thus the federal government
properly may intervene if pollutants are introduced into waters of the
United States regardless of the location of the polluting activity. The
relationship between water pollution and interstate commerce was
recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Zabel v. Tab b, 27 wherein the court
held that the Army Corps of Engineers may deny dredge and fill per-
mits for solely ecological reasons.
28
Although the Holland opinion upholds broad congressional power
to eliminate polluting activities even when they affect water bodies
373 F. Supp. at 672, -quoting from 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 250 (1973). The Corps of Engineers apparently
was not impressed by Representative Dingell's remarks. See note 36 and accompanying
text infra.
22. See 373 F. Supp. at 673-74.
23. Id. at 674.
24. Id. at 675.
25. See id. at 673. The Environmental Protection Agency's definition of "navigable
waters" under the 1972 Amendments extends federal jurisdiction considerably further
than did the navigability concept under the RHA, and includes:
(1) All navigable waters of the United States;
(2) Tributaries of navigable waters of the United States;
(3) Interstate waters;
(4) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized by interstate travelers
for recreational or other purposes;
(5) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams from which fish or shellfish are taken and
sold in interstate commerce; and
(6) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized for industrial purposes
by industries in interstate commerce.
40 C.F.R. § 125.1(o) (1973).
26. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-55 (1971); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
27. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
28. Id. at 204. Accord, United States v. United States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 445-
46 n.8 (7th Cir. 1973); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 11-13 (D.D.C. 1971).
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only indirectly,"9 and suggests that the purpose of the Amendments
can be achieved only by controlling some land-based operations, 0 the
holding of the case is limited to the discharge of pollutants onto land
periodically inundated by tidesl 1 Limited to its facts, Holland merely
expands the domain of federal control from the mean high-tide line
to the line of the highest normal tide. Arguably, the Rivers and Harbors
Act might already have protected these intertidal wetlands,' 2 in which
29. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
30. The Court states: "Getting at the source of pollution is going beyond the
confines of a high water line. It cannot be doubted that most of the damage to marine
life results from land-based and not sea-based activities." 373 F. Supp. at 675.
31. See id. at 675-76.
32. This is by no means a necessary conclusion, however. Plaintiffs did argue that
defendants' dredge and fill activities had violated the RHA. See 373 F. Supp. at 676.
Section 13 of the RHA might be read to support plaintiffs contention:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or pro-
cure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge,
or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing es-
tablishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom
in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States, or into any
tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed
into such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful to deposit, or cause, suffer, or
procure to be deposited material of any kind in any place on the bank of any
navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where
the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary
or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may
be impeded or obstructed ....
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
Several courts have interpreted § 13 to proscribe two distinct types of activity: (1) the
discharge of refuse into navigable water, regardless of whether that refuse obstructs
navigation; and (2) the depositing of refuse on the bank of a navigable water body,
where that refuse would obstruct or impede navigation if washed into the water. See
United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3d Cir. 1967); United States
v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1952); La Merced, 84 F.2d 444, 445 (9th
Cir. 1936). "Obstructions" within the meaning of the RHA may be found where ac-
cumulations of sediments reduce navigable capacity, United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 489 (1960), and it is not necessary that the discharge of solid
particulate matter be permitted to go unchallenged until a major obstruction is created.
United States v. Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Corp., 353 F. Supp. 451, 456 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
The court in United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1051 (D. Del. 1973), con-
ceded that the RHA does reach "activities on fast land" that create obstructions to
navigation. But the court refused to determine at the summary judgment stage
whether, if such activities have an impact on the environment, an RHA permit is re-
quired.
Section 13 might be interpreted to apply to activities such as those of the Holland
defendants, if sediment from the filling operations washed below the mean high-tide
line. If § 13 were not interpreted to proscribe such activities a riparian owner could
deposit piles of sand several feet from the mean high-tide line and allow rain and
higher tides to wash the sand into the water, thereby increasing his acreage. Although the
Holland court did not pass on the question, the court might not have interpreted the
RHA to reach the landbased operations of the defendants: "Just as it was not surprising
[Vol. 2
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case the holding is a confirmation rather than an expansion. Of greater
significance are the enlightened discussion of estuarine ecosystems and
the establishment of the fact that the smallest feeder stream is pro-
tected by the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Holland
marks a significant step in the battle against water pollution in
Florida" and is refreshing in its perception of the vital function the
coastal wetlands perform in our life support system.
The impact of the Holland decision may be limited by what seems
to be an inherent difficulty in enforcing environmental legislation.3 4
The Army Corps of Engineers, entrusted with the responsibility of
issuing dredge and fill permits under the Amendments,35 disagrees with
the Holland court and has concluded that the traditional "navigable
waters" and the Amendments' "waters of the United States" should
be interpreted synonymously.36 The importance of this interpretation
remains to be seen since the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
is the primary enforcement agency under the Amendments3 7 and the
Administrator of EPA has veto power over the issuance of fill permits.38
Holland leaves several questions unanswered. It is not clear whether
the 1972 Amendments protect land-locked bodies of non-navigable
water such as small lakes and streams feeding into them. Additionally,
it is not certain whether the Amendments would apply to pollutants
that filter through soil or through an aquifer into bodies of water.39
that Congress limited the Rivers and Harbors Act to navigable waters, it was not sur-
prising to have limited enforcement under the statute to navigation-impeding activities
taking place in the water." 373 F. Supp. at 670.
33. For other recent anti-pollution decisions affecting the State of Florida, see United
States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp.
486 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Yonge v. Askew, 293 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
34. See, e.g., Jaffe, Ecological Goals and the Ways and Means of Achieving Them,
75 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1972); Note, The Florida Environmental Protection Act of
1971: The Citizen's Role in Environmental Management, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 736, 755
(1974).
35. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (Supp. 1974).
36. 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115 (1974). Recently, however, the Department of Justice urged
the Corps of Engineers to relax its narrow interpretation of federal jurisdiction under
the Amendments and to adopt jurisdictional guidelines "that will provide for the
protection of the entire ecosystems dependent upon unpolluted and undisturbed waters,
rather than just that part arbitrarily delineated by mean high water." Letter from
Wallace H. Johnson to Manning E. Seltzer, August 16, 1974.
37. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(d) (Supp. 1974).
38. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c) (Supp. 1974).
39. This problem could arise in a number of circumstances. Some chemicals, such
as detergent sulfonates, may travel at full strength through filters and soil. S. GROvA,
URBAN PLANNING ASPECTs OF WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 43 (1969). Leakage from deep
injection wells used to discard industrial wastes is another possibility. Evans & Brad-
ford, Under the Rug, in OuR WORLD IN PERIL: AN ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 224 (1971).
In Great Britain the Water Resources Act of 1963, c.38, § 72, makes it an offense to put
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Would federal jurisdiction extend to a case in which surface runoff
carries pesticides from a farmer's field to a marsh, and months later
pollutes a distant water body? While Holland does not address these
issues, the language of the Amendments and their purpose, as inter-
preted by the court, should support the exercise of federal control in
such situations.
Real Property-DOCTRINE OF CUSTOMARY RIGHTS-CUSTOMARY PUBLIC
USE OF PRIVATELY OWNED BEACH PRECLUDES ACTIVITY OF OWNER
INCONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC INTEREST.-City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-
Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
Defendant corporation McMillan and Wright, Inc., was the record
owner of 15,300 square feet of dry-sand waterfront property in Daytona
Beach.1 The corporation obtained a permit to build an observation
tower intended for operation in conjunction with an amusement pier
on the property. The Attorney General of Florida and Tona-Rama,
Inc., the operator of an existing observation tower, claimed the de-
fendant was infringing on a public easement and sought to enjoin the
construction. The trial court refused to issue a temporary injunction
and the tower was completed. The court then entered summary judg-
ment for plaintiffs, finding that because defendant's land was servient
to a public prescriptive easement, the City of Daytona Beach had im-
properly granted the building permit. The corporation was ordered
to remove its tower.2
The district court of appeal affirmed 3 the finding of the trial court,
despite defendant's contention that public use of the dry sand area
"trade effluents, sewage effluent or other poisonous, noxious or polluting matter" by
means of any "wells, bore-hole, pipe or other work, into any underground strata within
a river authority's area .... "
1. Private ownership of Florida beaches extends only as far as the line of mean
high water. The area above this line is known as the dry sand area. The state owns
the land seaward of the mean high-water line. This area is referred to as the foreshore
or wet sand area. See Florida Coastal Mapping Act, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 75-56, § 4;
Commentary, The High Water Mark: Boundary Between Public and Private Lands,
18 U. FLA. L. REv. 553 (1966).
2. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 74-75 (Fla. 1974).
3. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1972).
[Vol. 2
